California V Us 438 Us 645 Law Review Articles

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Stance

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns overlapping federal and state regulation of a hydroelectric projection located near a California stream. California seeks to ensure that the project'south operators maintain water flowing in the stream sufficient, in the State'south judgment, to protect the stream's fish. The Federal Government claims the exclusive dominance to gear up the minimum stream flows that the federally licensed ability found must maintain. Each side argues that its position is consequent with the Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 UsaC. § 791a et seq. (1982 ed.), and, in detail, with § 27 of that Act. We granted certiorari to resolve these competing claims.

I

The Rock Creek hydroelectric project lies near the confluence of the South Fork American River and one of the river's tributaries, Rock Creek. Rock Creek runs through federally managed land located within California. The project draws h2o from Rock Creek to bulldoze its generators and and then releases the water near the confluence of the stream and river, slightly less than one mile from where it is fatigued. The state and federal requirements at issue govern the "minimum flow rate" of water that must remain in the bypassed section of the stream and that thus remains unavailable to bulldoze the generators.

In 1983, pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA or Human action), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license authorizing the operation of the Stone Creek projection. Keating, 23 FERC 62,137. Section 4(e) of the FPA empowers FERC to upshot licenses for projects

necessary or convenient... for the evolution, manual, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams... over which Congress has jurisdiction.

16 UsaC. § 797(east) (1982 ed.). Section 10(a) of the Human activity as well authorizes FERC to issue licenses subject to the conditions that FERC deems best suited for ability development and other public uses of the waters. 16 U.Due south.C. § 803(a) (1982 ed.). Congress' subsequent amendments to those provisions expressly direct that FERC consider a project's upshot on fish and wild fauna also as "power and development purposes." Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243, 16 U.s.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1). FERC issued the 1983 license and fix minimum menstruation rates after considering the project's economic feasibility and environmental consequences. In part to protect trout in the stream, the license required that the project maintain acting minimum flow rates of 11 cubic feet per 2nd (cfs) during May through September and 15 cfs during the residual of the yr. 23 FERC 62,137, at 63,204. The license likewise required the licensee to submit studies recommending a permanent minimum flow charge per unit, after consulting with federal and land fish and wildlife protection agencies. Ibid. In 1985, the licensee submitted a study recommending that FERC adopt the interim catamenia rates as permanent rates. The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) recommended that FERC require significantly higher minimum flow rates.

The licensee had likewise applied for land water permits, and, in 1984, the State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB) issued a permit that conformed to FERC's interim minimum catamenia requirements just reserved the right to set different permanent minimum flow rates. App. 65-67. When the WRCB in 1987 considered a typhoon guild requiring permanent minimum catamenia rates of sixty cfs from March through June and 30 cfs during the remainder of the year, the licensee petitioned FERC for a proclamation that FERC possessed sectional jurisdiction to make up one's mind the projection's minimum flow requirements. Rock Creek Express Partnership, 38 FERC 61,240, p. 61,772 (1987). The licensee, by then respondent Rock Creek Limited Partnership, also claimed that the higher minimum flow rates sought by the WRCB would render the projection economically infeasible. Ibid.

In March, 1987, FERC issued an lodge directing the licensee to comply with the minimum period requirements of the federal permit. In that order, FERC concluded that the task of setting minimum flows rested within its exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 61,774. The Committee reasoned that setting minimum flow requirements was integral to its planning and licensing procedure nether FPA § 10(a); giving effect to competing state requirements "would interfere with the Commission's balancing of competing considerations in licensing" and would vest in States a veto power over federal projects inconsistent with the FPA, every bit interpreted in Showtime Iowa Hydro-Electrical Cooperative five. FPC, 328 U. Due south. 152 (1946). 38 FERC, at 61,773. FERC as well directed an Administrative Police force Estimate to hold a hearing to determine the advisable permanent minimum menstruation rates for the project. Id. at 61,774. After considering proposals and arguments of the licensee, the CDFG, and FERC staff, the Administrative Law Judge ready the minimum menstruation rate for the projection at twenty cfs during the entire year. Stone Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC 63,019 (1987). Four days after FERC'southward declaratory order, the WRCB issued an order directing the licensee to comply with the higher minimum menses requirements independent in its draft guild. App. 73. The WRCB also intervened to seek a rehearing of FERC's club. FERG denied the rehearing asking, concluded that the Country sought to impose conflicting license requirements, and reaffirmed its conclusion that the FPA, as interpreted in First Iowa, provided FERC with sectional jurisdiction to determine minimum menstruum rates. Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC 61, 198 (1987).

The Courtroom of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed FERC's club denying rehearing. California ex rel. State H2o Resources Board five. FERC, 877 F.2d 743 (1989). That court, too, ended that First Iowa governed the case; that FPA § 27, as construed in Kickoff Iowa, did not preserve California'due south right to regulate minimum flow rates; and that the FPA preempted WRCB's minimum period rate requirements. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 493 U.South. 991 (1989), and nosotros now affirm.

2

In the Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 863, Congress clearly intended a broad federal role in the development and licensing of hydroelectric power. That broad delegation of power to the predecessor of FERC, still, inappreciably determines the extent to which Congress intended to take the Federal Government exercise sectional powers, or intended to preempt concurrent state regulation of matters affecting federally licensed hydroelectric projects. The parties' dispute regarding the latter consequence turns principally on the meaning of § 27 of the FPA, which provides the clearest indication of how Congress intended to allocate the regulatory authority of u.s. and the Federal Regime. That section provides:

Goose egg independent in this chapter shall be construed equally affecting or intending to bear upon or in whatever mode to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, employ, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or whatsoever vested right acquired therein.

16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982 ed.). Were this a case of offset impression, petitioner's argument based on the statute's linguistic communication could exist said to present a shut question. As petitioner argues, California'due south minimum stream flow requirement might plausibly exist thought to "relat[due east] to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used... for... other uses," namely the generation of ability or the protection of fish. This interpretation would accord with the "presumption against finding preemption of country law in areas traditionally regulated by the States" and

'with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to exist superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'

California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. South. 93, 490 U. South. 101 (1989), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Lift Corp., 331 U. Southward. 218, 331 U. S. 230 (1947); see California v. Us, 438 U. S. 645, 438 U. S. 653 -663 (1978) (tracing States' traditional powers over exploitation of water). Just as courts may not find state measures preempted in the absence of clear evidence that Congress so intended, so must they give full effect to evidence that Congress considered, and sought to preserve, the states' coordinate regulatory role in our federal scheme.

But the meaning of § 27 and the preemptive effect of the FPA are non matters of first impression. Forty-four years ago, this Court in First Iowa construed the section and provided the understanding of the FPA that has since guided the allotment of country and federal regulatory authority over hydroelectric projects. The Court interpreted § 27 as follows:

The effect of § 27, in protecting state laws from supersedure, is limited to laws as to the command, cribbing, use or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature. It therefore has primary, if not exclusive, reference to such proprietary rights. The phrase 'any vested right acquired therein' further emphasizes the application of the section to holding rights. There is zilch in the paragraph to suggest a broader scope unless it be the words 'other uses.' Those words, however, are confined to rights of the same nature as those relating to the utilise of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.

First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 175 -176 (accent added). The Courtroom interpreted § 27's reservation of limited powers to the States as part of the congressional scheme to split up state from federal jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects and, "in those fields where rights are not thus saved' to the States... to allow the supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural class." Id. at 328 U. Southward. 176.

We decline at this late date to revisit and disturb the understanding of § 27 set for in First Iowa. Equally petitioner prudently concedes, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, Get-go Iowa's interpretation of § 27 does non encompass the California regulation at issue: California's minimum stream menses requirements neither reverberate nor establish "proprietary rights" or "rights of the same nature as those relating to the use of h2o in irrigation or for municipal purposes." Offset Iowa, supra, at 328 U. S. 176 ; see Fullerton 5. State Water Resource Command Board, 90 Cal.App.3d 590, 153 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1979); accord, California Trout, Inc. 5. Land H2o Resource Command Board, 90 Cal.App.3d 816, 153 Cal.Rptr. 672 (1979). Instead, petitioner requests that we repudiate Start Iowa's interpretation of § 27 and the FPA. This argument misconceives the deference this Court must accord to longstanding and well-entrenched decisions, peculiarly those interpreting statutes that underlie circuitous regulatory regimes. Adherence to precedent is, in the usual case, a cardinal and guiding principle of adjudication, and

[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special forcefulness in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of ramble estimation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we take done.

Patterson 5. McLean Credit Wedlock, 491 U. S. 164, 491 U. S. 172 -173 (1989). There has been no sufficient intervening change in the law, or indication that First Iowa has proved unworkable or has fostered defoliation and inconsistency in the police, that warrants our departure from established precedent. Cf. id. at 491 U. S. 173. This Court has endorsed and applied First Iowa's express reading of § 27, encounter FPC v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435 (1955); cf. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U. Due south. 239 (1954), and has employed the decision with approval in a range of decisions, both addressing the FPA and in other contexts. Come across, east.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331, 455 U. South. 338, n. 6 (1982); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U. Due south. 765, 466 U. S. 773 (1984); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U. S. 320, 357 U. Due south. 334 (1958); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. five. Country Energy Resources Conservation and Evolution Comm'north, 461 U. S. 190, 461 U. S. 223, n. 34 (1983). By directing FERC to consider the recommendations of state wildlife and other regulatory agencies while providing FERC with final authority to establish license conditions (including those with terms inconsistent with the States' recommendations), Congress has amended the FPA to elaborate and reaffirm First Iowa'due south agreement that the FPA establishes a broad and paramount federal regulatory role. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 803(a)(1)-(3) (FERC to issue license on weather condition that protect fish and wild animals, after considering recommendations of state agencies), as amended by the Electrical Consumers Protection Act of 1986; sixteen U.Southward.C. §§ 803(j) (1)-(2) (FERC license weather protecting fish and wildlife to exist based on recommendations of federal and country wild animals agencies, with FERC to issue findings if it adopts conditions contrary to recommendations); cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409, 476 U. S. 424 (1986) ("We are peculiarly reluctant to reject this presumption [of adherence to precedent] in an area that has seen careful, intense, and sustained congressional attending").

Petitioner asks this Court fundamentally to restructure a highly complex and long-enduring regulatory regime, implicating considerable reliance interests of licensees and other participants in the regulatory process. That departure would be inconsistent with the measured and considered modify that marks appropriate adjudication of such statutory bug. Meet Foursquare D Co., supra, at 472 U. S. 424 (for statutory determinations, " it is more important that the applicable rule of constabulary exist settled than that it be settled right.... This is commonly truthful, fifty-fifty where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation,'" quoting Burnet five. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 285 U. S. 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

Petitioner also argues that we should condone First Iowa's discussion of § 27 because it was simply dictum. It is true that our immediate business organisation in First Iowa was the interpretation of § 9(b) of the FPA, which governs submission to the federal licensing agency of prove of compliance with state law. [ Footnote 1 ] The Courtroom determined that § 9(b) did not require licensees to obtain a state allow or to demonstrate compliance with the state constabulary prerequisites to obtaining such a allow. First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 163 -164, 328 U. S. 167, 328 U. Southward. 177. Instead, the Court construed the section merely as authorizing the federal agency to require evidence of deportment consistent with the federal permit. Id. at 328 U. Southward. 167 -169, 328 U. Due south. 177 -179. First Iowa's limited reading of § 27 was, nevertheless, necessary for, and integral to, that conclusion. Similar this instance, First Iowa involved a state permit requirement that related to the control of water for detail uses simply that did non relate to or establish proprietary rights. Iowa had required as one condition of securing a state permit that diverted water be

returned... at the nearest practicable place without being materially macerated in quantity or polluted or rendered deleterious to fish life,

Iowa Lawmaking § 7771 (1939), a provision the Court found to conflict with the federal requirements and to "strik[e] at the center of the present project." First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 166 -167, 328 U. S. 170 -171. The Courtroom reasoned that, absent an limited congressional command, § 9(b) could not be read to require compliance with, and thus to preserve, state laws that conflicted with and were otherwise preempted by the federal requirements. See id. at 328 U. S. 166 -167 ("If a country allow is not required, there is no justification for requiring the petitioner, as a status of securing its federal allow, to present evidence of the petitioner'due south compliance with the requirements of the State Code for a state permit"); id. at 328 U. S. 177. Simply the Court's narrow reading of § 27 immune it to sustain this interpretation of § 9(b). Had § 27 been given the broader meaning that Iowa sought, it would have "saved" the state requirements at issue, made the state permit one that could exist issued, and supported the interpretation of § ix(b) every bit requiring evidence of compliance with those state requirements, rather than compliance merely with those requirements consequent with the federal license.

The Court'southward related, just more than general, rationale for its reading of § ix(b) in Kickoff Iowa also necessarily rested on its narrow construction of § 27. The Court framed the issue as whether the Act immune united states to regulate through permit requirements such as Iowa's "the very requirements of the project that Congress has placed in the discretion of the Federal Ability Commission." Id. at 328 U. S. 165 (footnote citing FPA § 10(a) omitted). The Court rejected the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction and interpreted the FPA as mandating divided powers and

a dual system involving the close integration of these powers, rather than a dual system of futile duplication of two government over the same subject affair.

Id. at 328 U. S. 171 ; come across id. at 328 U. S. 174 (no "divided authority over any ane subject"); id. at 328 U. Southward. 181 (comprehensive federal role "exit[s] no room or need for conflicting state controls"). Section 9 reflected the operation of this sectional federal dominance. See id. at 328 U. South. 167 -169; id. at 328 U. S. 168 ("Where the Federal Government supersedes the state regime in that location is no suggestion that the 2 agencies both shall have final say-so"). In accordance with this view, the Courtroom interpreted § 9(b) equally requiring compliance only with state measures relevant to federal requirements, rather than, every bit would be under a system of concurrent jurisdiction, compliance with the state requirements necessary to secure the state permit. Id. at 328 U. S. 167 -169. Instead, simply § 27 preserved and divers the States' exclusive regulatory sphere. Id. at 328 U. Southward. 175 -178. That is, the Court rejected an interpretation of § ix(b) that would take "saved" or accommodated the country permit organisation and its underlying requirements. To reach its interpretation of § 9(b), however, the Courtroom had to interpret § 27 consistently with the limited land regulatory sphere and in a manner that did not, past "saving" the Iowa requirements, establish "divided authority over whatever ane subject." Id. at 328 U. Due south. 174. Constricting § 27 to embrace only laws relating to proprietary rights, and thus leaving the permit requirements at effect to the federal sphere, achieved that goal. The Courtroom's discussion immediately afterward its extended discussion of § 27 illustrates the relation between the sections. Before distinguishing § 27's role in saving state constabulary from § 9(b)'s office in the sphere of exclusive federal regulation, the Courtroom ended:

[Section 27] is therefore thoroughly consistent with the integration, rather than the duplication, of federal and state jurisdictions under the Federal Power Deed. It strengthens the argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus 'saved' to the States, Congress is willing to let the supersedure of the state laws past federal legislation take its natural class.

Id. at 328 U. S. 176. The Courtroom's interpretation of § nine(b), of course, rested on that supersedure, and required that the remaining field "saved" to united states by § 27 exist limited correspondingly.

Petitioner also argues that our decision in California 5. United States, 438 U. S. 645 (1978), construing § eight of the Reclamation Act of 1902, [ Footnote 2 ] requires that we abandon Start Iowa's interpretation of § 27 and the FPA. Petitioner reasons that § eight is like to, and served as a model for, FPA § 27, that this Court in California v. United States interpreted § viii in a mode inconsistent with First Iowa's reading of § 27, and that that reading of § eight, subsequent to Outset Iowa, in some manner overrules or repudiates Kickoff Iowa's understanding of § 27. California v. Us is cast in broad terms, and embodies a formulation of the States' regulatory powers in some tension with that fix forth in First Iowa, just that determination bears quite indirectly, at best, upon interpretation of the FPA. The Court in California v. United states of america interpreted the Reclamation Human action of 1902; it did not ad to, or purport to interpret, the FPA, and held simply that § eight requires the Secretary of the Interior to comply with state laws, not inconsistent with congressional directives, governing use of h2o employed in federal reclamation projects. California five. United states, supra. As well, equally in First Iowa, the Courtroom in California v. United States examined the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the entire statute before information technology, and employed those sources to metaphrase the statute's saving clause. See 438 U.S. at 438 U. Due south. 649 -651, 438 U. S. 653 -670, 438 U. S. 674 -675. Those sources bespeak, of class, that the FPA envisioned a considerably broader and more active federal oversight role in hydropower evolution than did the Reclamation Act. Compare FPA §§ 4, 9, 10, as codification, 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 802, 803, and Starting time Iowa, 328 U.S. at 328 U. Due south. 164, 328 U. S. 167 -169, 328 U. South. 171 -174, 328 U. South. 179 -181, with Reclamation Act of 1902 §§ ane, 2, 32 Stat. 388, as codified, 43 U.S.C. §§ 391, 411 (1982 ed.), and California v. U.s.a., supra, at 438 U. S. 649 -651, 438 U. S. 663 -670.

Even if the two saving clauses were properly viewed in isolation from the residue of their respective Acts and resulting regulatory schemes, significant differences exist between them. Section 8 of the Reclamation Human action, after referring to country h2o laws relating to water used in irrigation and preserved by the Act, contains an explicit direction that "the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall go on in conformity with such [state] laws." 43 United states of americaC. § 383 (1982 ed.). This linguistic communication has no counterpart in § 27 of the FPA, and was crucial to the Court's estimation of § 8. See California v. United States, 438 U.South. at 438 U. Due south. 650, 438 U. S. 664 -665, 438 U. S. 674 -675. Although California five. United States and Outset Iowa accordance dissimilar result to laws relating to water uses, this difference stems in role from the unlike roles assumed by the federal histrion in each example, every bit reflected in § 8's explicit directive to the Secretary. The Secretary, in executing a detail reclamation projection, is in a position analogous to a licensee nether the FPA, and demand not comply with country laws alien with congressional directives respecting item reclamation projects, see id. at 438 U. S. 672 -674; similarly, a federal licensee under the FPA need not comply with state requirements that disharmonize with the federal license provisions established pursuant to the FPA'due south directives. An additional textual difference is that § 8 refers only to "water used in irrigation," and contains no analogue to § 27'south reference to "other uses," the provision essential to petitioner's argument. Laws controlling h2o used in irrigation relate to proprietary rights, every bit the First Iowa Court indicated, 328 U.S. at 328 U. Southward. 176, and due north. 20, and § 8 does non indicate the appropriate handling of laws relating to other water uses that do not implicate proprietary rights.

Given these differences between the statutes and saving provisions, it should come equally no surprise that California v. United States did non refer either to § 27 or to First Iowa. Since the Court decided California 5. United States, we have continued to cite Beginning Iowa with approval. Meet, e.g., Escondido Mut. H2o Co., 466 U.South. at 466 U. S. 773 ; Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 223, due north. 34; New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 455 U. S. 338, n. six. Nosotros do non believe that California v. U.s. requires that we disavow Start Iowa in this case.

Finally, petitioner argues that § 27's legislative history requires u.s. to abandon Showtime Iowa'south interpretation of that section. Whatever the usefulness of legislative history for statutory interpretation in the usual example, that source provides petitioner with no aid. If a quite natural reading of the statutory language fails to displace an intervening determination providing a contrary interpretation, legislative history supporting that reading and, by definition, before the Court that has already construed the statute provides picayune boosted reason to overturn the decision. Cf. Patterson, 491 U.Southward. at 491 U. S. 172 -174 (reviewing sources near likely to prompt overruling of decision). Indeed, First Iowa expressly considered the legislative history of the FPA, and of § 27 in particular, and found that source to support its interpretation of both. Starting time Iowa, supra, at 328 U. S. 171 -174, 328 U. South. 176, n. 20, 328 U. Southward. 179. Given the tangential relation of the legislative history to the event at paw and the interests supporting adherence to First Iowa, we decline to parse again the legislative history to decide whether the Court in Outset Iowa erred in its agreement of the development, as well as the meaning, of the statute.

Adhering to First Iowa's interpretation of § 27, we conclude that the California requirements for minimum instream flows cannot be given issue and immune to supplement the federal menstruum requirements. A country measure is

preempted to the extent it really conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal constabulary, or where the state law stands every bit an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.

Silkwood 5. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. Due south. 238, 464 U. South. 248 (1984) (citations omitted). Every bit Congress directed in FPA § 10(a), FERC set the weather of the license, including the minimum stream flow, afterward considering which requirements would all-time protect wildlife and ensure that the project would be economically feasible, and thus further power development. See Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC 63,019 (1987); Keating, 23 FERC 62, 137 (1983); see also Rock Creek Express Partnership, 41 FERC 61,198 (1987). Allowing California to impose significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements would disturb and conflict with the rest embodied in that considered federal agency determination. FERC has indicated that the California requirements interfere with its comprehensive planning authorisation, and we agree that assuasive California to impose the challenged requirements would exist contrary to congressional intent regarding the Commission's licensing dominance, and would "constitute a veto of the project that was approved and licensed by FERC." 877 F.2d at 749; cf. First Iowa, supra, at 328 U. S. 164 -165.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

Affirmed.

---

Notes

[ Footnote one ]

Section 9(b), 16 U.Due south.C. § 802(a)(2) (formerly 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1982 ed.)), provides:

(a) Each applicant for a license under this affiliate shall submit to the commission -- * * * *

(2) Satisfactory bear witness that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and utilize of h2o for ability purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting and distributing power, and in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a license nether this chapter.

[ Footnote 2 ]

Department 8 of the Reclamation Deed of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, at present 43 UsaC. §§ 372, 383 (1982 ed.), provided in office:

[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any Country or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, employ, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested correct caused thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall go on in conformity with such laws, and nada herein shall in any manner impact any correct of any State or of the Federal Government or of whatsoever landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof....

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